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HCD7CONH 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 16 Cr. 370 (CM) V. 5 MATTHEW CONNOLLY and GAVIN CAMPBELL BLACK, 6 Defendants. 7 ----x 8 New York, N.Y. December 13, 2017 9 9:45 a.m. 10 11 Before: 12 HON. COLLEEN MCMAHON District Judge 13 14 **APPEARANCES** JOON H. KIM 15 Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 16 BY: D. BRITTAIN SHAW 17 CHRISTOPHER JACKSON JESSEE ALEXANDER-HOEPPNER 18 Assistant United States Attorneys PAUL HASTINGS LLP 19 Attorneys for Defendant Matthew Connolly 20 BY: KENNETH BREEN PHARA GUBERMAN 21 LEVINE LEE LLP 22 Attorneys for Defendant Gavin Campbell Black BY: SETH LEVINE 23 SCOTT KLUGMAN MIRIAM ALINIKOFF 24 AARON KARP 25

(Case called)

(In open court)

MS. SHAW: Brittain Shaw on behalf of the United States. With me at counsel table is trial attorney Christopher Jackson, trial attorney Jesse Alexander-Hoeppner, and legal assistants Claire Donohue and Martina Neeple.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. LEVINE: Good morning, your Honor. Seth Levine, Scott Klugman, Miriam Alinikoff and Aaron Karp for Mr. Black, I'm very pleased, your Honor, Mr. Black has made the trip and is here today; he's sitting on the end. And also at counsel table with us is Stephanie O'Connor, who is helping us, to the extent we need it, with technical assistance today.

THE COURT: OK, great.

MR. BREEN: Good morning, your Honor. Ken Breen and Phara Guberman for Matt Connolly, who is with us here in the courtroom.

THE COURT: Hi, Mr. Breen.

MR. BREEN: How are you.

THE COURT: OK. Since I think that we're going to end up mostly talking about matters other than what we were originally going to talk about -- and we have a lot of people here who will be going home on an afternoon train -- will you excuse me for one moment.

OK, so let me tell you where I am. I would say I'm

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woefully -- first of all, welcome to the taint team -- I'm woefully unprepared because I got the exhibits to @agent Weeks' affidavit like at 4:10 yesterday afternoon. I had many other things on the calendar and I have not reviewed them.

Now, what that means is that Mr. Levine is going to get the first crack at shaping how I'm going to think about them, but you should just be aware of that.

I have read all of the affidavits, most of which I was able to print off. If we're going to talk about grand jury material, obviously we're going to have to do that in a closed courtroom. But good morning.

I assume that you are going to put in your affidavits, your exhibits and you're going to rest.

MS. SHAW: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's at least what you told me in a letter.

MS. SHAW: Well, with respect to putting in the affidavit, absolutely, your Honor. As we indicated in our letter, we were proceeding today by affidavit. Clearly we're not resting at this time because we still await Mr. Prange's testimony in January.

THE COURT: Correct.

MS. SHAW: And certainly one can't predict -- I can somewhat predict, but in any event we would still have the opportunity to supplement following any cross or any case put

forward by the defendant.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know, but perhaps you're not familiar with the concept of resting. One rests after one puts forward one's case. One's rebuttal case does not require that one not rest after putting in one's case.

I agree you have the one witness in reserve who is going to testify, and he's going to testify in January, because that's when he can be here, and I am deeply grateful to our British friends for freeing him up to come over in January, but aside from that, as far as I'm concerned, based on what you've told me, you're resting. Whether you have a rebuttal case after Mr. Levine does whatever he does, that's up to you.

MS. SHAW: Yes, your Honor. For today we're proceeding by affidavits, and we would submit that the affidavits, as your Honor had requested, attest that there has been no exposure to any of the trial team, any former trial attorneys, and no exposure to agent Weeks. So, in addition, special agent Weeks sets forth a legitimate independent basis for each point in his grand jury testimony.

THE COURT: Which I can't discuss in an open courtroom. I know he says it, and I just haven't gone through the, I don't know, 500 pages of exhibits that didn't accompany the affidavit but that arrived at 4:10 yesterday afternoon.

MS. SHAW: Apologies, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK, fine. Mr. Levine, good morning.

MR. LEVINE: Good morning, your Honor. Thank you for hearing us.

So, your Honor, obviously we're having a hearing without a witness, so that's less dramatic than we had hoped, but I think --

THE COURT: This is not about drama, Mr. Levine. Whatever else this is about, it's not about drama.

MR. LEVINE: I think the issue for today is how you would like me to proceed. I understand the government has now offered these affidavits. The taint team and Mr. Black's counsel, we worked hard together to work through things. I am happy to reserve all --

THE COURT: What is it that -- putting Mr. Prange to one side, what is it that you would do? Are there some of these folks whom you would like to cross-examine and you can convince me that there is a reason to cross-examine them?

MR. LEVINE: Well, your Honor, I think that there is a couple of different issues in that respect. Let me say the following: I believe that, first of all, Mr. Prange, or other people from the FCA who I will talk about in a moment, are central, as your opinion says, to understanding this, for the simple reason that — and this is something that frankly we are going to get into with Mr. Prange and get into it today.

The premise of this hearing is the government has said to you that there was a wall erected between the trial team at

least, members of the Department of Justice, other than my friends that are sitting at the front table, and folks that had access to Mr. Black's compelled testimony, whether that be in a government organization or otherwise.

Your Honor, it's our contention -- and I don't think there is anything to refute that -- that there has been not a single piece of evidence proffered in the government's case to you to establish such a wall.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Levine, how can you say that? I have 20 some odd -- 31 people who have sworn under oath, declared on oath that they were behind a wall, that they were in no manner, shape or form exposed to the testimony of Mr. Black.

MR. LEVINE: Well, I actually don't know that that's what they say. What they say mostly — and there are some differences, but they didn't read it, and they don't say anything in fact, in any of these affidavits, whatsoever, not a word, about who people talked to and what the interactions were.

Now, Judge, I'm happy to do this today or can I do it on the 22nd, but I will be happy to prove to your Honor that the extent of the interaction between these agencies was not what has previously been proffered to you as they didn't talk, they issued settlements on the same day, they didn't share any paperwork but they really weren't involved with each other.

That story -- which underlies this entire thing -- is false.

We now have many documents that prove that, and prove that many of the representations that have been made to this court about the nature of this "wall" are, to be kind, inaccurate.

Now, I know the court has not had a chance to read everything as closely, as you said. There is not a single word in these affidavits about the wall other than a reference in a couple of affidavits -- Ms. Saulino, Ms. Anderson, who is on the trial team -- that says there was a wall.

I know this court is quite aware that a wall concept -- whether it's under legal rules or banking rules -- is under the ABO rules a screen -- which is how it's defined in model rules -- is defined as something that isolates in that case a lawyer from all information, and that is done commonly through physical proximity, through --

THE COURT: Lack of physical proximity.

MR. LEVINE: -- lack of physical proximity, through various other procedures and methods, to ensure that there is no communication through a person that might have whether it's a conflict or taint and someone else. It's a common procedure; I know the court is well aware of them. Firms use them all the time.

What that requires is a procedure. It requires notification. It requires logging and notice of where

materials went. It requires people being told not to communicate.

What you have here is nothing in these affidavits about lack of communication. In fact, all you have from Ms. Anderson and Ms. Saulino is that we told people at the FCA to not tell us.

The reason you don't have anything, Judge, is because there is no wall. The only wall there is here is the equivalent of the following gesture: Don't tell me what you know, as you sit next to me in meetings, on phone calls, in a joint conference between the FCA, the SFO and the Department of Justice, which a dozen DOJ folks went over, as we understand it from the documents, and talked. They have unbelievable numbers of contacts, Judge, about everything in this case, and the only thing you see is them telling Mr. Prange, well, let's structure this investigation in a way that you can say you didn't tell me anything.

Now, the government has every right to prove that there is a wall, but there is no proof here of any wall whatsoever. There is a reference to it. I have asked for instructions. I've asked for how did you physically separate these people. I don't believe that any of my friends at this front table are going to stand up and tell you that Mr. Meaney, Mr. Prange, Mr. Salame, Mr. King, the people that were involved in the FCA and others, did not have regular contact with the

trial team and other members of the Department of Justice in the United States, in London, that they had frequent meetings.

THE COURT: And what difference would that make unless there were some evidence that they shared the content of Mr. Black's compelled testimony, which, by the way, I have read? That is one of the things I have read.

MR. LEVINE: And I think, your Honor, that there is such evidence that Mr. Prange -- and we will hear from him -- sat with Mr. King and debriefed him, having first -- contrary to what you have been told -- I'm happy to show you the documents -- exchanged documents with the government, planned out how to do the King proffer, and they had constant contact back and forth where they discussed every aspect of this case and how to manage it, and how to manage each other's own issues.

So, the notion that what you had here was two separate teams that happened to just cross in the night and Mr. Prange showed up in a room one day, these affidavits don't talk to you about that at all.

THE COURT: Well, one of the things that's occurred to me -- and I would like it -- I will tell you what I would like to do. I would like to spend the next two hours with you, and I would like -- and then possibly again tomorrow morning, if we need to -- but I would like you to put in whatever documents, and I would like you to explain to me what you think those

documents show.

MR. LEVINE: Sure.

THE COURT: But I accept as a given the fact that there was communication between the Justice Department, the FCA and the SFO in the course -- extensive communication -- in the course of this investigation.

What has to be shown in order to demonstrate a violation of Kastigar is that Mr. Black's compelled testimony was the basis of some action taken by the government in connection with the case against him here and there was no independent source.

And I will tell you, having read Mr. Black's compelled testimony, that I think for almost all points it will be fairly easy for the government to demonstrate an independent force. It's not like his story in his compelled testimony was so different in any respect than the stories of other people who proffered to the government, who have turned on your client and intend to testify against him.

MR. LEVINE: Well, your Honor, I guess I'd have to say that one problem with that is that all those folks came in to talk to the government after they heard my client's compelled testimony.

THE COURT: Not according to the list they gave me. According to the list they gave me, one person came in to talk after that.

MR. LEVINE: Well, we think, your Honor, that Mr. King's testimony and Mr. Curtler's testimony is in fact tainted, and we think that, therefore, the grand jury proceedings are tainted.

We think that Mr. -- and a lot of this frankly I think, your Honor, is going to be more sensible to come in through Mr. Prange, because you'll see it all. But let me raise with you another issue that came to our attention this morning as I walked into the courtroom.

So, one of the things that we and the taint team have done is we have demanded unsurprisingly discovery, and we have had discovery provided to us. One of the big issues obviously we were looking for is not only Jencks Act material but Brady and Giglio.

You have an affidavit before you, your Honor, from Mr. Meaney from the FCA. Well, there are a lot of problems with Mr. Meaney's affidavit, in fact, problems that we would suggest suggest it can't even be received by the court, along with some of the other affidavits. But that sort of pales in comparison to the fact that I was handed a 302 -- or sent -- I don't even have a copy of it, Judge. I just have it on my iPad -- which the taint team tells me was overlooked, which recounts --

THE COURT: Oh, there is Mr. Meaney's affidavit.

MR. LEVINE: So Mr. Meaney has two things, your Honor.

If you recall, when the Kastigar motion was initially filed, the government submitted to yo a letter from Mr. Meaney, and then they also submitted to you an affidavit very recently.

The letter -- which I can put up on the screen, if you like -- THE COURT: Sure.

MR. LEVINE: -- was dated in August.

THE COURT: I've got it.

MR. LEVINE: So, this is the initial letter, but let me just tell what you his 302 says.

If you look at this letter and you look at the second paragraph, Judge -- and this is the letter that the government told you you should not hold a Kastigar hearing because of, because, after all, you have the letter and this is the FCA and what's all this bother about -- well, Mr. Meaney told you in the last line of the second paragraph, "We provided a copy of Mr. Black's interview to the United Kingdom's Serious Fraud Office on January 23, 2017." He also told you in the beginning of that paragraph, "We have not provided any compelled testimony to Mr. Black other than a copy of his own transcript. We have not provided Mr. Black's transcript to any other Deutsche Bank's individuals apart from Mr. Black." It seems pretty categorical to me, your Honor.

He also told you on paragraph 4, that he hadn't even provided a copy of Mr. Black's testimony to DOJ. And he then told you on the last page -- or he told Ms. Shaw -- that oh, by

the way, I understand this is to be submitted to a court, so I know this is not some casual communication; this is serious communication. And the government relied on it.

Well, your Honor, if you actually look at Mr. Meaney's affidavit that he put in the other day, it turns out there is a lot of stuff in this letter that wasn't quite accurate.

For example, it is not true that the SFO was provided the testimony in 2017. In fact, based on both Mr. Meaney's new affidavit and the SFO affidavit, which was also put in, they provided that testimony way back in 2015, in fact before the grand jury even met in this matter.

MS. SHAW: Your Honor, may I just interject for a moment?

THE COURT: No, you may not. You may make notes because you're going to respond to this, but I want to go through this argument about this document and this affidavit, and then I will hear you.

MS. SHAW: I understand, your Honor. It's just this document is under seal under the court's order, and I just wanted to raise that since we're speaking in open court.

MR. LEVINE: I apologize.

THE COURT: Then we're going to have to clear the courtroom. I have to clear the courtroom. Sorry. We have a bunch of documents that have grand jury material. And the first thing I will do is I will talk to them about whether this

has to remain under seal. 1 2 You can stay. You have a client in this case. 3 MR. BREEN: Yes. But there are members of my team who 4 here as well. 5 THE COURT: Everybody else has to go. 6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, I'm an attorney 7 with Portfolio Media, Inc. 8 THE COURT: Sir, you are here as a representative of 9 the press; you are not a party to the case. I'm going to have 10 to ask you to leave while I conduct an inquiry. Do you mind? 11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I will of course abide by any 12 and all of your Honor's directives. I just wanted to state my 13 client's position that I understand the court has issued 14 sealing orders, that this is in connection with the sealing 15 orders the court has already issued. As I understand, what is about to happen is discussion about documents that are 16 17 currently filed under seal. We ask that the courtroom be 18 promptly reopened as soon as all matters concerning --

THE COURT: Oh, trust me, it will be.

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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And the last thing I will say is we reserve all of our rights with regard to --

THE COURT: And you reserve all of your rights.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you so much.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Breen, the members of your team, the member of Mr. Levine's team, are perfectly welcome to stay;

(In open court)

THE COURT: Welcome back.

MR. LEVINE: So, your Honor, I was directing your attention to this letter, which we can put back up. This letter, I just want to orient the court, this letter came into as part of the initial Kastigar briefing, and I think there is no objection to this letter.

MS. SHAW: No.

MR. LEVINE: Thank you very much. I want to be careful and respectful here.

So, your Honor, you have this letter. I would take it that the FCA submitting a letter to this court would have been quite careful in making sure that they were being scrupulously accurate about what they told you. It turns out that that absolutely was not the case.

Mr. Meaney's affidavit makes perfectly plain -- as does the affidavit from the SFO, which was put in also, which is Government Exhibit 33 -- that in fact disclosure was made in 2015. That is, as I said, important because the grand jury here, of course, met in '16. Therefore, the letter from the FCA initially that the court had to deal with suggested at least the possibility of taint of the grand jury might be more remote because the disclosure occurred after the grand jury had already met. So, that's the first problem with the affidavit.

The affidavit also then goes on -- Mr. Meaney's

affidavit -- to talk about giving this testimony apparently to a taint team at the SFO. I have tried to check around a little bit since we have the affidavit, and I'm not familiar with the SFO having taint teams. I could be wrong.

THE COURT: Possibly they had to invent them for this very matter.

MR. LEVINE: They could, your Honor. I noticed in the affidavit 33 of Lois van der Skratten that she makes no mention of a taint team whatsoever, and it's also curious that that is a particularly American phrase, taint team. So, I don't know where that comes from or why the SFO would not have mentioned that to your Honor.

THE COURT: The government may be in some position to enlighten us or Mr. Prange might be in some position to enlighten us.

MR. LEVINE: That's true, your Honor.

So, those problems, and the fact that --

THE COURT: I note the inconsistency.

MR. LEVINE: And also, your Honor, the fact that
Mr. Meaney when he prepared this letter to you didn't bother to
tell you that, hey, of course I provided this testimony to the
taint team. While one might think is an oversight, given the
delicate diplomatic negotiations that have occurred to allow
this document to even be proffered to the court, and the fact
that it was being proffered in unsworn form, would have

suggested to me that the authors would have been careful, because, after all, we're dealing with serious business here about the rights of one of their own citizens.

But that's not the only concern that I have about what I think will be a theme of mine throughout this hearing, which is not only is it not careful, it is not really consistent with a full story of what has happened.

But to finish off the "it's not careful" part, your Honor, the affidavit of Mr. Meaney, the affidavit of Ms. von der Skratten, the affidavit of Mr. Curtler the cooperator and Mr. King are actually invalid under U.S. law.

You ordered these folks to put in a sworn statement.

They are permitted under 1746 to put in a sworn statement,
substitute of a declaration, but the statute requires that they
attest that they are committing to the penalty of perjury under
the laws of the United States if they are signing the
declaration from without the United States.

You will note on Mr. Meaney's declaration he uses no such language. Now, if this was an affidavit attaching some documents by a lawyer, or a declaration attaching some documents by a lawyer, or if this was not essentially being proffered to you as a testimonial substitute, perhaps these kinds of points could be simply ignored.

THE COURT: OK. So, your problem is that Mr. Meaney says only I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct. That's offensive to you; that doesn't cut it.

MR. LEVINE: It doesn't. The statute, your Honor, says if a declaration is executed without the United States, I declare, certify or verify under penalty of perjury and the laws of the United States of America that the following is true and correct.

THE COURT: OK. So, it's the omission of "under the laws of the United States of America," so we should indict them for 1001.

MR. LEVINE: No, your Honor. I'm not looking to penalize Mr. Meaney at this point at least. I am looking, however, to point out to the court that we've got four testimonial affidavits submitted from London that were apparently the subject of great back and forth between our nation and another, and after the declarations from cooperators whose credibility is certainly at issue, and for whatever reason Mr. Meaney's declaration, the SFO's declaration, doesn't even conform with the law.

Now, I understand, your Honor, that those in other contexts might not be the biggest points — and they're not the biggest points here — but my point to you, Judge, is that this business requires precision; it requires saying how do we cabin and isolate information; and they're asking you to take the word of a lot of folks that we don't know and you don't know

because they have letterhead from agencies and they carry badges and they carry credentials.

Well, fair enough, they're entitled to do that, but I'm not entitled and my client is not required to take the word of folks when between the Department of Justice, the FCA and the SFO, they can't file a proper declaration. And if that were the only issue, then I wouldn't be saying anything about this, because it would be a technical issue.

But what is the explanation for why Mr. Meaney told you in his letter that the transcripts weren't provided until 2017?

And I will ask you another question, your Honor, which I think is more pertinent: When did the United States

Department of Justice learn that Mr. Meaney's letter was inaccurate in a material way? And why didn't they tell you?

Why didn't they come to this court and say, you know what, Mr. Meaney, he just made a mistake, he made a mistake, he should have said 2015, we regret it, no big deal. That's fine, people make mistakes all the time.

But here I'm standing here today in a Kastigar hearing -- which I had to win over the objections, the very forceful objections of my friends in the front row -- and they didn't tell you that their main person from the FCA got it wrong.

That raises to me at least the question -- I'm not

attributing any intentionality. I'm just saying that doesn't give me great comfort that what has happened here is entirely clear.

Now, this morning as I walked into court -- and I appreciate that I got it at least while I was walking in, and there isn't even a paper copy -- and because the court was so gracious to allow us to have electronic devices, I have been able to pull it up on my iPad -- a 302 report of Mr. Meaney who apparently has been interviewed three times starting on November 29, on December 1 and December 8 of this year. I have received no such report of an interview with him prior to his submitting that letter, which surprises me a little bit, because I would have thought that the United States would have done something to verify the contents of a letter being submitted to your Honor. I have no information on that.

We have also asked for the notes of these meetings, although Mr. Jackson has told me that they will consider it, but that they're not in a position to provide those yet. I think the agent is sitting in the courtroom, and perhaps he has them.

In this remarkable document, your Honor, it says that during one of these meetings Meaney initially advised the FCA provided the transcripts of Gavin Black's compelled testimony to a lawyer at Slaughter and May -- I will leave her name out; there is no reason for that -- who is Deutsche Bank's UK

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counsel. Meaney believed that the FCA began turning documents over to the defense sometime late in 2014, but he was advised he would attempt to find out the exact date the Black transcript was given to this lawyer.

Well, your Honor, that was at the earliest November 29, 2017. Months earlier, Mr. Meaney had told you this didn't happen at all -- at all -- and he told you that it didn't happen in 2017.

THE COURT: Well, it tells me in this newest affidavit he doesn't indicate that it happened.

MR. LEVINE: Let me finish, because we have a turn in the plot here. There is then in the 302 -- and I just read it quickly this morning -- additional interviews and additional inquiries made. Another member of the FCA is tasked to actually go figure out who has this and when did we give it to people. And it turns out that they say in the end we didn't give it to Slaughter and May; sorry I was wrong. And they reviewed some set of records. In fact, they had to call Slaughter and ask them. They then also had to ask the Serious Frauds Office when they got the transcript, because apparently it wasn't clear to the FCA when they had given it. And this was all very confusing, this compelled testimony that only has my client's constitutional rights in the balance. Nobody seems to know where it was. And I can't tell you the end of the document.

THE COURT: And I must say I appreciate your most recent statements but, remember, despite all the warnings that come from the western side of the Pond to the eastern side of the Pond, he has no such rights in England.

MR. LEVINE: Well, your Honor, actually he does in the following sense: Compelled testimony in the United Kingdom by the FCA is not admissible against Mr. Black in a criminal proceeding in the United Kingdom.

So, their rules are a little different, but one of the reasons that the FCA is able to compel, as has been explained to us, is that it cannot be used against him in a criminal proceeding. So, while they do not have our Fifth Amendment the way that we have it, it is compelled in the United Kingdom, and it is compelled in a way that does actually grant Mr. Black very substantive rights to not have criminal prosecution brought against him based on this. So, I do think, your Honor, that that is an important point.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. LEVINE: My only point is we then encounter another problem, which I'm going to come back to, which is there are vast number of documents that were produced to me that involve communications with the FCA, the SFO, with Paul Weiss, that have enormous redactions, so I can't even figure out what the communications are, because they will have a very tantalizing title and then they're all redacted out.

I don't know what the end of the story here is with Mr. Meaney. I also know that when they submitted an affidavit to you, your Honor — turning to Mr. Meaney's affidavit — just a few days ago, they made no mention of the fact that Mr. Meaney had made a statement to them after he submitted a letter to you that basically says, oh, by the way, what I said before wasn't true either about the date or about who got the stuff, who got the transcript, so forgive me.

THE COURT: Possibly they knew that you would tell me.

MR. LEVINE: Well, except, your Honor, they put in this declaration — and I got this 302 this morning, and I actually don't attribute ill motive to the taint team. They have told me it's an oversight; I accept their representation — but what I'm saying to you, Judge, is we haven't even started yet with what happened here with this information and how information was passed. We've got the lead person from the FCA, OK, sending you a letter that's inaccurate in multiple ways, making a representation on the crucial issue of who got this document. It can't be casual. He is being called by two trial attorneys from the Department of Justice on a matter that he has already made, as the government has told you, an extraordinary submission, and it's just wrong. I mean wrong in the sense of inaccurate.

So the question I have for you -- and now I have an affidavit which for some curious reason is not ascribed in the

appropriate way. Now, I don't know if that is just simply an oversight that nobody bothers to read the rules. That could be.

THE COURT: I'm going to guess that's what it is.

MR. LEVINE: It doesn't matter to me. What matters to me is this: I've got somebody that says I can't even figure out who we gave this thing to. And I will show you the Department of Justice own guidelines in the U.S. Attorney's manual — which is read by less people than perhaps it should be — talks about the need to isolate materials, and one of their rules is you need to have the testimony of a compelled person in a secure place. What these affidavits say to me is whatever happened here was ad hoc, not secured, and people don't know what they're talking about.

Now, your Honor, I would certainly understand if Mr. Meaney was called out of the blue by these folks, but he wasn't.

THE COURT: Mr. Levine, you aren't suggesting that the FCA or the SFO in Great Britain are bound by rules of the United States Department of Justice for how the United States Department of Justice handles --

I'm sure that -- well, I'm not sure. I'm not sure of anything. I would hope that the taint team which has a copy of Mr. Black's testimony has it in a secure facility and that it is not being stored in the same office as the office where the

trial team is working. In that event, they would be complying with the United States Attorney's manual.

So, I mean you have a wonderful fascinating habit of introducing red herrings into this.

MR. LEVINE: Well, your Honor, I think, first of all, my understanding is that the taint team and the trial team are not only in the fraud section, in the same building and actually are not separated.

And one of the points I'm going to make to you is I don't even understand today that this taint team -- the taint team that I'm familiar with from my days in the office was you generally had somebody in a different section who had a different chain of command who didn't talk to you.

These guys are in the Bond building, working on cases right now with the trial team, some of them involving Deutsche Bank and the FCA. There is no separation here at all. That's why I said there is no wall.

There is no wall either between the FCA and the Justice Department, and there is no wall that I can see -- because they won't give me any information about it -- with even this taint team. These guys are colleagues.

I'm not accusing them of anything at all. I'm just saying the fraud section is doing the investigation of the case, and therefore we're going to use the forfeiture section to do the taint team, which I know in another situation I have

in the Eastern District that's how they're doing it. We don't have that here, Judge.

The reason I raise this -- and I respectfully don't think it's a red herring -- is because what evidence is before you about the operation of either this taint team or the operation of the wall?

I will tell you — and every brief that's been filed in this matter from the taint team and from the prosecution team is signed under the same supervisor. She is one of the affiants here. Now, she is head of the fraud section, but there is no separation that I can see. If there is one, fine. What is it? Because I will tell you in the documents they produced to us one of the members of this prosecution team is currently investigating Deutsche Bank on another matter and interacting with the FCA with two of the members of the trial team.

Now I'm not suggesting for a second that there might not be something in place, but when you look at what a screen means — certainly for a law firm who is familiar if you don't screen people properly, you lose your client and get disqualified — this doesn't look like that.

So what I say as my first point, Judge -- and following up on the Meaney affidavit -- is that you do not see things this court should take confidence in because you're following the procedures, the best practices that are

necessary, to support the finding of a robust and thorough screen. And if you can't be confident of that, then I would respectfully suggest that the heavy burden here can't be met.

You say in your opinion, I believe on page 22, that one of the reasons Mr. Prange needs to come here is he needs to account for his contacts with the Department of Justice between the time of the compelled testimony and the time of the grand jury indictment, and for trial, first time for all time up until and after the trial.

They can't do that -- and they haven't done it in any of their affidavits -- because what they're going to tell you is these people are talking all the time, and they're interacting all the time, including discussing how they structure interviews with people so Mr. Prange doesn't ask questions that might get the compelled testimony out, even though the government is going to be not there but hearing about it later.

There is no wall at all. And on that basis, on that structural basis, I believe the court should find alone that there is not any Kastigar protection.

So, when you say to me, you know, Mr. Levine, it's just a silly declaration the guy said under oath, said under penalty of perjury, you're right, Judge. Is it going to be an abuse of discretion if you let it in? No, it's not. But it should very, very seriously make you think, I respectfully

submit, that what has happened here is that the guy in the FCA can't even tell you when he gave the testimony, and he has said on a call with an F.B.I. agent in the last two weeks, hey, we gave this stuff to Slaughter and May, and then for some unknown reason he has now changed his story again.

I've asked him for all the documents that refreshed witnesses' recollection in this matter. They told me I can't have them because I can't have them. OK, well, then under 612 I move that this affidavit shouldn't come in, because this guy has clearly gone one way and then the other, he has told you five different things that aren't true; they won't tell me what refreshed his recollection; I don't think that this affidavit has any competence because it's invalid; strike it.

So, I think that's the first point we would make, that there is no evidence of a wall and there is no evidence that this affidavit is not right.

Now, we will not get into right now Mr. Meaney's statements about the relationship between Mr. Black's testimony and the FCA notice. I will say this though -- and I will show this to you --

THE COURT: Well, is it time for us to discuss that? Because that material needs to remain under seal, we would clear the courtroom and the press.

MR. LEVINE: I would really like to -- I think -- THE COURT: You want to wait.

MR. LEVINE: Here is the problem I have, your Honor. You offered me a hearing with Mr. Prange. I don't think I should have to try my case before I see somebody live. Because I am very concerned — with all respect, and I'll show you why — that there has been a lot of representations made to this court on a lot of topics that are just flat not true, and I think it's going to change your view of how you look at all of these affidavits. This is the first one.

THE COURT: I hear you. And your argument is an argument that I think goes to the weight. I'm not going to strike the affidavit. You knew I was not going to strike the affidavit. But it goes to the weight, unquestionably goes to the weight.

But I remind you that the Second Circuit in Allen found a Kastigar violation because the key witness in front of the grand jury testified that the only source of information that he had about certain matters as to which he testified before the grand jury apparently was the compelled testimony of the two defendants. It didn't rule that a wall was missing bricks, or the failure to adhere strictly to the Federal Rules of Evidence or to the U.S. Attorney's manual or anything like that rose to the level of a Kastigar violation.

And I think you can take it on faith that whatever I'm going to do, I'm not going to extend what the Second Circuit held in Allen. I'm bound by what the Second Circuit held in

Allen, but I'm not going to broaden that in any way.

So, I accept your argument insofar as it goes to the weight. I'm annoyed -- we will use that word -- by the fact that there is an obvious inconsistency between information that I was given by this individual Mr. Meaney last August and information that I am being given by this individual Mr. Meaney when he is now under oath in December, but it's an argument that goes to the weight. In the end what the government has to establish is that nobody was in fact exposed --

MR. LEVINE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- even if the wall was just a hedge.

MR. LEVINE: I don't think it was even that; I don't think it exists at all.

But, look, your Honor, I hear what you're saying. I think everything I'm going to argue in this hearing fits very comfortably within Allen which, of course, as your opinion points out, there is direct taint, which is easier. But here we are talking about indirect taint.

THE COURT: Yes, it's much easier.

MR. LEVINE: And here, your Honor -- look, frankly, I think if Mr. Meaney's affidavit is going to be taken, he should have to come here and bear witness. I think that the man has told so many stories, I can't even keep track of them, and if Mr. Meaney doesn't want to bear witness, I don't think the court should take anything he has to say very seriously,

because he obviously doesn't care very much about what he says to this court.

And I must say I am surprised -- unhappily surprised, frankly -- to see that we have such a lack of -- at best a total lack of care in preparing these things. Whether I'm right or wrong about taint doesn't matter. We should not be guessing about any of this.

I understand what the court's ruling is. I don't think that there is anything I'm asking for -- because here is the problem. Meaney, Prange, King, the whole bunch of them, are in constant communication with DOJ. And, your Honor -- and I will get to this in a second -- they have made representations to you about what those communications were. And those representations are: We didn't strategize, we did not share settlement paperwork, we stayed away from compelled kinds of information. So, if those statements aren't true, then the entire premise here begins to fall away. And I think that's in fact what is going to happen.

I'm going to address those things, but first I want to address the cooperators, because they also have the same problems with their affidavits. And what is more troubling — especially about Mr. Curtler's affidavit — is that Mr. Curtler's affidavit — which is one of these sort of plain vanilla nothing happened, I don't know anything — he also submitted a supplemental affidavit. Have you seen that, Judge?

They submitted a supplemental declaration for Mr. Curtler last night. Have you seen that?

THE COURT: No, I have not seen it.

MR. LEVINE: Oh. Well, I'm happy to hand one up to you, if you'd like, your Honor. May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LEVINE: This is Government's 4A. We received it yesterday evening quite late.

So, Mr. Curtler told you that, again, I haven't seen anything, except I did review, I got the Hayes transcript, but that's it, trust me on that.

His affidavit is also improperly ascribed. But apparently somehow miraculously last night Mr. Curtler got refreshed; he actually had a copy of the trial transcript in what is called a brokers trial in London.

This is paragraph 4. We can put it up on the screen, 4A. A lot of people are having some last-minute recollections here. And this affidavit -- also improperly ascribed -- tells us that I have since had my recollection refreshed -- this is paragraph 3 --

THE COURT: Right, which means somebody told me.

MR. LEVINE: -- with additional materials regarding transcripts of one further trial.

Now, that sounds to me like somebody told me something. It's not that I found the transcript sitting in my

attic and I said, oh, gees, I can't believe I forgot this.

It's somebody came to me, said something to me, and I decided to put in another affidavit to this court.

Now, I don't know what happened. I have asked, as I said, for any information that would reflect anybody, and I have been told I am not entitled to that, for a witness that I'm not able to cross-examine.

But, you know, Judge, that's just the beginning with Mr. Curtler. Because, let me tell you something, when Mr. Curtler came into the Department of Justice -- after my client testified -- the first thing he was told in his first interview was something that I still frankly don't quite understand, given our wall. He was told by one of the members of the trial team that he shouldn't tell the trial team anything he's learned from the FCA, or thought that he got through open source reporting. And this going to be DX 51. This, by the way is also -- this is a 302. It is also attached to Mr. Weeks' testimony, but it's a 302 that has been disclosed. I don't think there is any problem with it. But if you can bring up DX1, and if you would please highlight the last part of the first paragraph.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LEVINE: OK. So this is now October of 2015. The DOJ, the FCA, all settled with Deutsche Bank. My client doesn't get indicted until '16. The Rabo issues are already

out there. And the instructions for Mr. Powers are, hey, buddy, just don't tell me; don't tell me what you know.

Now, if you're concerned -- because we already believe that there is material that has tainted him out there, and that they're litigating Rabo; they know there is a problem -- that's not what a prosecutor says usually. They say, gees, we better have a taint team interview this guy to make sure that we don't taint our case. Because, you know what, we've already got a problem with this issue.

According to affidavits submitted in the Rabo case but not this case, starting no later than 2011 or 2012, the FCA was given instructions by the Department of Justice on Kastigar — so, years into the problem — you're telling the guy, hey, just don't tell me because, after all, it's magic; if you don't tell me, then somehow it didn't happen.

How does one do that? How does one divide one's mind between what you know from the FCA and what you know from other sources? It's a little bit like, Judge, charging somebody for being a derivatives trader who is told to trade derivatives and at the same time having that same person be a submitter for LIBOR where they're saying that if you come to work every day and trade your derivatives and submit LIBOR you're a criminal. Oh, that's what happened here, that's what they charged Mr. Curtler with. So, they want him to live up to a standard that they say Mr. Curtler's failing to live up to is criminal. But

that's a case for another day. That's their literal position here.

Because on their third proffer, which is DX54, second paragraph, they say, you know what, prior to the first meeting had with DOJ, and also prior to first communicating with his own attorneys, Curtler read press coverage related to the Deutsche Bank resolution with the United Kingdom's Financial Conduct Authority. He also read the settlement statement with Deutsche Bank. He never read any witness statements associated with the FCA's investigation. Nothing he read ever caused him to cooperate with the DOJ. Not the FCA notice. Not all of these trials. He just decided to do this out of the goodness of his heart.

What did they do then? Did they ask Mr. Curtler:
What else did you read? We say the FCA notice is totally
tainted, so it doesn't matter. What did you read? Let's get a
taint team in here? Let's talk to this guy and find out what
he knows and how he knows it? Did they do a line-by-line
review to figure out what his information was?

They did nothing. In fact, they did so much nothing that they don't even tell you about that in Curtler's affidavit. You have a government cooperator, signed-up agreement which we just got, pled guilty. They submit an affidavit to this court not telling you about this. It's in my

brief. They don't tell you about this? They don't tell you about being direct taint? Who did he talk to in London after he got these transcripts? What information was he being provided? Who is the little birdie refreshing his recollection?

This isn't a joke; this is serious business. And the government just submitted to you another affidavit. They didn't tell but this, your Honor, or have Mr. Curtler say, you know, here is what I've done since 2013 to assure you that in all of my communications they're pure. Maybe he can say that; maybe he can't. But he hasn't. And that's why I say again, is this just lack of attention to detail? Or as you said on page 24 of your opinion you've told people what they have to do: Did not review any charging document. Did not attend any trial. 3, did not discuss the testimony or anything derived from any person who has been identified as being exposed to it OK. Well, the FCA, this document — and we're going to show you why I know this document is compelled testimony — is exposed. They know that. They know it at the time.

THE COURT: This document being?

MR. LEVINE: The FCA notice, your Honor, the settlement.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LEVINE: And we will mark that in a second.

So, your Honor, again now we have a cooperator. And,

look, Kastigar doesn't have a lot of law, but I do think,

Judge, we have a lot of experience with how we use cooperating
witnesses to establish facts. We do it in affidavits, search
warrant affidavits, the government does it all the time.

And it is, of course the law in other contexts -- not this context -- that if you were going to use a person that has an agreement with the government, a person that has reason to curry favor, that you disclose that fact in a candid way in the affidavit, whether they be a cooperating witness or simply a source, bolster their credibility, and allow the court to at least have the benefit of knowing what is going on.

I don't believe in any of the exhibits that you're going to look at, Judge, for Mr. Weeks or anyone else that the government has informed this court -- who did not take Mr. Curtler's plea -- what his deal is.

Now, you might decide to credit his affidavit nonetheless -- and of course I'm not going to tell the court what to do other than to suggest what I think might be the might interpretation of the facts -- but I can sure say it troubles my client and it troubles me that Mr. Curtler -- who has enormous credibility problems in this case -- as they tell you, Mr. Curtler had a different story before he talked to the government, a different story before my client gave compelled testimony. And now that he has suddenly changed his tune, but not very much, the government in my view has simply, you know,

put the arm on him to say, yeah, everything we did was wrong, even though his evidence will show that he knew what he was doing wasn't wrong, because it was completely endorsed by everybody, that his actions were proper.

So, they're asking you to take his word for it -yeah, Judge, I didn't see anything, I only saw the Hayes trial.

Oh, wait a second, I guess this supplemental affidavit also
just came to be last night, I should be grateful, instead of

Mr. Meaney who we got this morning.

I mean what is going on here? Even if the government contends to you, you know, we're still right about this, it doesn't give the court and should not give the court any confidence that we know what's going on here, because we don't.

What did this man look at? What indirect taint? You told them what to say. You literally wrote them an order and said if you say the following three things, and you do it reasonably credibly, you've got a good case to get rid of this problem. They didn't do it. Where is that in Mr. Curtler's affidavit?

So again -- and I happen to think that for a cooperating witness who has massive credibility issues I think caused by the government, but massive credibility issues nonetheless -- I think having a proper affidavit that is ascribed under the laws of this country would be a good thing.

Now, the government has said to you in a letter last

night that we should seal the courtroom because none of the trial witnesses here are infected. How do I know that? I don't have affidavits from the trial witnesses. I don't even know who they are some of them.

So, what are they talking about? What we have with Mr. Curtler is a situation that this court cannot find as a matter of fact or law what influences have been put on him.

THE COURT: Mr. Curtler is not going to testify at trial? I mean I thought he was one of the principal cooperators.

MR. LEVINE: He is. He is absolutely testifying at trial.

THE COURT: OK. He will have to be cross-examined in connection with this hearing. I mean he is a witness in this case.

MR. LEVINE: I understand.

THE COURT: He is not some official from the government of Great Britain.

MR. LEVINE: I agree, your Honor. My only point to you is when we start going through these affidavits -- now with Mr. King, we have a similar problem, and that's -- I think that's government 8, your Honor. We can put that up, if we could.

Yeah, so, you know, Mr. King doesn't tell us anything. He just said says, yeah, I didn't see it, I haven't looked at

any trials. He doesn't talk about who he has talked about. It doesn't say who he has discussed it with, it doesn't say what procedures have been applied. He just says, yeah, I don't know anything about that. He doesn't even tell you, he doesn't even disclose to you what happened with Mr. Prange when he was debriefed by him.

Now, maybe he doesn't remember and it's hard for a witness potentially to say how he was influenced. The government is skilled in doing that on their own. But I don't know, I don't see his affidavit tells you there is no taint. It doesn't comply with your order on its face.

And I will say, your Honor, one of the reasons I was so concerned, and I wrote you a letter about the government resting, is because I absolutely object to them being able to supplement these affidavits now, because I'm here, we're ready. I wanted to go with Prange today. I think it's very, very prejudicial for us to have to do this in January when the trial is in February, and it's not right after all this time that they now come and say, hey, we want to fix these affidavits. It's just not right. I have asked you for an order on that, but I wanted to point it out again now.

Also Mr. King doesn't tell you about the deal he has. We just got it. It's a nonpros. He wasn't charged. OK, fair enough. Where is that in this affidavit to give this court some comfort that you understand the basis for the statements

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he is making and what his possible motives are? It's not in here either.

Again, they're not telling you the whole story. And regardless of what the story is -- and I think that story is a bad one -- candor, directness, is required in a Kastigar hearing.

You know, I thought a lot over the last months about why it is the courts always describe Kastigar as a heavy burden. It's a preponderance, that's the burden, which we don't usually think of, at least us criminal lawyers. And I think the reason it's heavy is not because of the quantum of evidence but because it is one of those instances where the very weight of our system is on the government to justify that something didn't happen that we believe very firmly in our bones as Americans cannot happen, which is the breach of the promise to be free from self-incrimination is truly an important promise that we have. And I think the reason courts call it a heavy burden is because if in fact there is even a chance that indirectly somebody's Fifth Amendment rights have been compromised through the government's forcing people to bend a knee and talk about themselves -- a concept which is inimical to our version of liberty -- the government has a heavy burden in the system to show in a serious and somber way it didn't happen, we're OK.

That's why it's heavy. It's not just heavy because of

who has to prove what. It's heavy because it's a somber and important responsibility. And I think so far I've showed you I don't see that that's been discharged. And I'm not casting aspersions. I'm just saying this is serious business, and I don't see here serious work to make this court comfortable.

THE COURT: OK. Sit down for a minute, Mr. Levine. Sit down for a minute and let me hear from the government on what has been said so far.

MS. SHAW: Yes, your Honor. First, we would agree with the court with respect to where Allen has brought us, which is not in a world where Kastigar taint is an airborne pathogen. There doesn't need to be a wall, as your Honor indicated. And we would submit that the filter system that is in place has been more than adequate.

The fact that we are in the same office building is not an adequate allegation to suggest that I go around reciting Mr. Black's compelled testimony for all to hear, or that I give access to my file cabinets to others. That's just not what is prescribed by Kastigar, and it's certainly not an allegation that I think has any evidentiary weight here.

I did want to correct for the record what Mr. Levine said about the FCA compelled testimony in UK law. While it is true that his compelled testimony under UK law from the FCA, they can't use it directly against him in court, it is not the same as immunity here where you can't use it indirectly.

THE COURT: I understood that that is what Mr. Levine was saying. He said they were not determinant. They are not determinant.

MS. SHAW: Very well, your Honor.

With respect to Mr. Meaney's declaration, we would submit that the first one is not inconsistent but it is incomplete and, you know, certainly it's an issue that goes to weight.

I would submit that certainly these are events that happened some time ago. I can't attest to how the FCA conducts their discovery files or records. And I think your Honor aptly pointed out they're not bound by the U.S. Attorney's manual. Our role as the filter team is to go and get answers. And I think the declaration will certainly show you that we attempted to get as much detail from Mr. Meaney and others as we could in terms of dates.

I think your Honor has also noted that --

THE COURT: I wish you had done that in August.

MS. SHAW: Regrettably that did not happen, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. SHAW: In any event, all of the representations counsel makes really are an attempt to get into this larger argument that I understand he has raised with the trial team about this joint prosecution and trial team and how this is

all, you know, one big prosecution team. And it's my understanding from the trial team — and certainly I will defer to your Honor — that those two or the several attempts he has made to raise this have not been successful.

But we're here because of one issue, and that is whether there was any exposure to Mr. Black's compelled testimony to any trial witness, to any prosecution team member.

THE COURT: Grand jury witness.

MS. SHAW: Yes, grand jury witness. And we would submit that on the affidavits there has been no exposure. And Mr. Prange's testimony in January will further bear that out.

We would also submit that the FCA warning notice does not -- at least according to the -- and you will hear this from Mr. Prange and I believe from Mr. Meaney's declaration also --

THE COURT: Are we getting into that? Because I thought we were not getting into that. I thought Mr. Levine said paragraph 9 -- he could keep paragraph 9 off limits until we could have a sealed hearing.

MS. SHAW: That's fine.

THE COURT: That was the one thing that would remain sealed, paragraph 9.

MS. SHAW: Of the warning notice?

THE COURT: No, of Mr. Meaney's affidavit, which discusses things about the warning label. Right? Am I right?

MR. LEVINE: Yes, your Honor.

MS. SHAW: In any event, all of the things that counsel is emphasizing, this notion that these witnesses — which it was never our intention — it's my understanding the court was well aware that there were cooperators in this case from the trial team.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. SHAW: So, it was certainly not filter team's intention to not inform the court of that with those declarations. I thought that was well known. And certainly we had turned over the materials to defense.

THE COURT: I have never seen the cooperation agreements. As Mr. Levine knows — because I'm kind of notorious for it in the building next door — my motto is the judge is always the last to know, and I am not ordinarily given that information by the United States Attorney for this District until 3500 material arrives. And it hasn't arrived.

So, no, I don't know what their deals are; I didn't know that Mr. King was nollied. It is information that if I decide that he doesn't have to be cross examined -- and I feel rather differently about the cooperating witnesses than I do than other people who have given affidavits -- but if I decide that he were not have to be cross-examined, then I would certainly want to know that about him; I would want to know what his deal was. Correct, it's a pertinent piece of information.

MS. SHAW: And certainly --

THE COURT: Now I do, I know he has been nollied.

MR. LEVINE: Nonpros.

MS. SHAW: And certainly that information would come out at trial, and Mr. Levine would have an opportunity --

THE COURT: No, but you want me to accept his affidavit now at this hearing. This hearing is not the trial. This hearing is this extra hoop that I am required to make you jump through, and so it's got to come out here too. This is its own little mini trial.

MS. SHAW: Correct. And the affidavits that we put forward show — indicate on their face that there was no exposure. The allegations that counsel makes — again attempting to sort of create this cloud of misrepresentations as though the trial team made misrepresentations to the court about the interactions with the FCA — is, as your Honor pointed out, a red herring. Nobody has said that nobody spoke to the FCA and they wouldn't take calls; that's not the case.

THE COURT: No, on the contrary, on the contrary, it's been quite clear that for the last six years the FCA and the United States Department of Justice have been working hand in glove, that's quite clear. That, as I read Allen, was not the reason that the Second Circuit concluded there had been a Kastigar violation. I think the Second Circuit was perfectly aware that there was extensive cooperation in the LIBOR

investigation between the FCA and the Justice Department. I don't recall that that was the reason or a reason assigned for finding that there was a Kastigar violation.

MS. SHAW: I agree, your Honor. And, you know, I would submit that the government is not in agreement with the Allen decision.

THE COURT: Well, I know you're not in agreement, but there is nothing I can do about that. I'm not sure where you are in the process of trying to get rid of it, but I know you'd like to get rid of it, but you aren't rid of it.

MS. SHAW: Correct, your Honor. I would note though, however, one thing -- one of the many questions that the Allen decision left open is the notion that Kastigar even applies in this instance.

THE COURT: Look, I understand that that's the government's position. I assume -- has the Circuit denied? I think the Circuit's denied. Have you filed a cert petition?

MS. SHAW: That matter is under consideration. We're considering all options.

THE COURT: Well, you can't be very serious about your argument if you didn't have a cert petition in the drawer ready to file on the day when the Second Circuit told you no. You can't be very serious about the argument.

MS. SHAW: I'm not at liberty to discuss deliberative processes within the Justice Department, but it's my

understanding we have 90 days.

THE COURT: Yes, that is the law, you have 90 days.

The rule is that you have 90 days. When, by the way, will the 90 days run?

MS. SHAW: Off the top of my head, I don't know the day that the en banc --

THE COURT: Does anyone know when the mandate came down from the Second Circuit? Because it's 90 days from the date of the issuance of the mandate.

MS. SHAW: I don't have the date of the mandate on the top of my head, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you know, Mr. Levine?

Mr. Breen, do you happen to know?

MR. BREEN: I don't, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK, nobody cares but me.

MS. SHAW: So, your Honor, with respect to counsel's representations about the Meaney affidavit, again I --

THE COURT: Well, you have to admit that you say there is no inconsistency, that the first letter was incomplete. I would say were I to accept your representation — which, by the way, I do not — woefully incomplete might be an adequate way of describing the first letter. Woefully incomplete. I see an inconsistency.

MS. SHAW: Very well, your Honor. I would submit, however, one difference between the two and sort of the format,

is that Mr. Meaney drafted that first letter to us without --

THE COURT: Right, because you hadn't gone over there and done what the lawyers from the United States Department of Justice do, which is put your witness through his paces.

Guess what, I made an unwarranted assumption. I could not believe that the United States Department of Justice would be so careless as to submit to me a document -- not under oath but that was being proffered in lieu of a document under oath -- from somebody who was essentially its witness without talking to the witness, prompting the witness, asking questions of the witness, getting the witness's full story.

I think you and I would be in agreement that

Mr. Meaney's letter of last August would have read rather

differently if you had had with him in July the conversation

that you obviously had with him in November. And I actually -
based on my prior dealings over the last 19 years with the

Department of Justice -- thought that you had. I thought you

had.

There are two people sitting in this room who appeared before me as assistant United States attorneys, and it never would have occurred to them when they were in the office here to have submitted a document to me in any form without having heard the story of the individual who authored the document; it just never would have happened. I don't know, I never worked in the office, I never worked in the Department of Justice, but

as a result my experience is informed entirely by what goes on 1 in the building next door and what they do in this building, 2 3 and I tell you they are very careful about those things. MS. SHAW: Well, your Honor --4 5 THE COURT: Main Justice I have very few dealings 6 with. 7 MS. SHAW: Your Honor, I would submit we're not representing that we did not speak with Mr. Meaney prior to 8 9 that letter. And again, you know ---10 THE COURT: Whoa, I don't think you want to make that 11 representation to me. 12 MS. SHAW: No, I'm not representing -- we spoke to him 13 and requested the letter, your Honor. Again, as of July -- and 14 the date is not clear in my head as to when the Allen. 15 THE COURT: The letter came in August. MS. SHAW: But certainly I believe the briefs were due 16 on this issue in late August. We had been advised that the 17 18 filter team needed to respond at a late date. They were traveling to London to put documents and interview the witness. 19 20 THE COURT: Put that on the trial team, I quess. 21 MS. SHAW: In any event, your Honor, if there are 22 additional questions concerning.

THE COURT: No, anything you wanted to respond to that Mr. Levine said? Then he wants to talk again, because Mr. Levine always wants to talk again.

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MS. SHAW: Understood, your Honor. That's all I have. 1 2 THE COURT: Your turn, Mr. Levine. 3 MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, I do note just one interesting little fact, and I agree with my friend from 4 5 Washington that I believe she is correct that there is no 6 derivative use in the UK. And, as the court pointed out, I 7 wasn't suggesting so. 8 But that does raise an interesting question in my 9 mind. As I understand it, the bar is the introduction of the 10 testimony itself, not to its derivative use. So, why ever would the SFO need a taint team? There is no need for it if 11 12 all you have to do is not present it to a court. 13 THE COURT: You know, I'm not going to second guess 14 Her Majesty's government on why it decided to create a taint 15 team in a circumstance when it is confronted with the need on the one hand to cooperate with American prosecutors and on the 16 other hand to deal with its own business in England. 17 I can understand fully why Her Majesty's government 18 19 might choose to create something that's not normal procedure 20 for that government in order to deal with the peculiarities of

our government which has them all the time.

MR. LEVINE: I quite agree, your Honor, and that's why

THE COURT: Good.

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MR. LEVINE: -- that's why it's surprising to me that

in Government Exhibit 33, the affidavit from the SFO itself, there is no mention of a taint team. The only mention of a taint team is in Mr. Meaney's affidavit. So, apparently the SFO did not think it important at least to reveal that, which is why I question. I don't know.

THE COURT: I got to tell you, I'm underwhelmed by that argument, Mr. Levine.

MR. LEVINE: Fair enough. Your Honor, I'm just trying to get the facts. Also, your Honor, for your edification, I believe that the mandate issued on November 9, and on February 7 the 90 days will elapse.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LEVINE: Well, your Honor, I didn't hear a word about indirect taint about Curtler or King. So, I suppose we can move on from there; the government doesn't intend to contest the fact that they have not established that there is an indirect taint, because it's not in the affidavits.

MS. SHAW: The government doesn't concede that at all. The affidavits on their face indicate there has been no exposure. And I don't believe anything that counsel has brought up changes that.

Again, it's a preponderance standard, and there is no -- he has pointed to nothing other than the fact that they're cooperators, which is always an argument one can make when somebody admits to a criminal offense. But I think that

just from a logical argument perspective --

THE COURT: Well, it's Mr. Levine's position that the affidavits if accepted as true rule out the possibility of direct taint. It is his further position that they do not rule out the possibility of indirect taint as, for example, by conversations with people who were exposed. That's his position. The government's position is?

MS. SHAW: That there is no one that he has been in contact with with respect to the government or the government trial team or former ones who would have passed that on; that Mr. Prange — who will be here — and I won't put words in his mouth — was, as the FCA was, was told not to put compelled testimony of anyone to their witnesses. And they did so out of this concern that we had about compelled testimony.

So, what counsel has is speculation, but, you know, these transcripts are confidential, they are not to be passed around London. This wasn't something that was --

THE COURT: I think that's the best part of the government's argument, that it violates UK law to make these transcripts available or to discuss them.

MS. SHAW: Correct, your Honor. So, you know, other than mere rank speculation that that happened, I don't believe that Mr. Levine -- that counsel has a basis for attacking the affidavit that's before this court. Certainly he will be able to cross-examine Mr. Curtler on the stand at trial and do

whatever he wants to do with the fact that he is cooperating with the government.

But for purposes of Kastigar I do want to point out -and I won't get into the substance of Mr. Black's compelled
testimony -- but your Honor has read it, and I think it would
be -- it's not the case where it's the kind of thing that
would, as Mr. Levine said, force someone to change their tune.

If anything, it defies that notion, because your Honor has seen
it -- and I will leave it at that -- we have characterized it
in our briefs, and your Honor has also seen it, but this is
hardly the thing where, you know, because of reading that, even
if he was exposed -- which we're saying he was not indirectly
or directly -- it's not the kind of thing one would logically
change your tune after reading; in fact, one might proceed very
differently.

So, with that, your Honor, that would be my point with respect to the two cooperators that Mr. Levine just mentioned.

MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, there is not a word in their affidavit complying with the court's order on page 24 that a representation that the person did not discuss the testimony or anything derived therefrom from any person who has been identified as having been exposed to it.

There is just no representation there whatsoever. And they talk to Mr. Curtler. They did ask him. And he said, you know what, I read a bunch of stuff, including the FCA notice

and other things. They didn't even ask him. We have the 302s. They didn't ask him what else have you been exposed to. And they come to you now and say -- Judge, what Ms. Shaw said, nobody on the trial team talked to him? That's all terrific statements. They're not in the trial team's affidavits. They're not in Mr. Curtler's affidavits. They're not in any submission that's been made to you. She has just said it.

The whole purpose of this hearing is this is their witness, this is their evidence, it's not here. So what might be here, I don't know. I can't guess what might be here. I know that Mr. Curtler can't be consistent even on what he has. And the Department of Justice twice asked him about this and purposefully it seems didn't get the full answer.

So, when Ms. Shaw says there is nothing to see here, if she can point to me where in this affidavit she explains what he said in his 302, or explains his change of testimony from last night, then fair enough; but if she can't, then the government should just concede the point and we should move on, because the words on the page are the words on the page. So, if there is something I'm missing, I'm happy to be corrected.

MS. SHAW: Your Honor, counsel moved from the cooperator back to Meaney, so with respect --

THE COURT: No, he's still talking about -- because he's talking about Curtler and the supplemental declaration and the, oh, oops, I read the transcript of the brokers trial too.

MS. SHAW: Yes, your Honor. Certainly, as I mentioned before, you know, folks remember things over time. I do have --

THE COURT: Well, let's be fair. This is worded in a way that says somebody told me that I read the brokers transcript; I have had my recollection refreshed. Not I woke up yesterday morning and I remembered that I had read it. But I've had my recollection — or somebody told me that I requested copies of the transcripts in the brokers trial and I got them; I don't recall reviewing them.

Well, I don't think he didn't review them. I don't think he got them and put them in the closet unread. I don't believe that. All right?

I don't recall becoming aware of any reference of the compelled testimony of Gavin Black.

Now, we didn't specifically address -- our British friend did not in any of their affidavits particular trials, as I recall. I think what they said was a general statement that his testimony was not referenced or read from at any trial that took place in the UK. I think that's what somebody said.

MS. SHAW: That is what the original letter had said, and I believe it said "to the best of my knowledge," and then your Honor requested that either the SFO attest --

THE COURT: And somebody is looking at transcripts.

MS. SHAW: Yes, a colleague of ours has done extensive

computer searches and reviewed — there are about over 22,000 pages of transcripts from the three trials, and spent I think 77 hours going through them with a computer, and has found no references whatsoever to the compelled testimony or anything that appears to be derived from it.

THE COURT: Wait. Once upon a time I actually litigated cases, and that certainly would have been in my affidavit. That would have been Exhibit 37. And Exhibit 35, if I had been representing the government, would be the affidavit from that person to tell me that he/she had spent 77 hours reviewing every page and all the computer references of the three trials that were held in London, and could not find a single reference to the compelled testimony of Gavin Black. But there is no such evidence in the record, as Mr. Levine points out.

MS. SHAW: There is. Exhibit 35 is the declaration that attests to all of those specifics.

THE COURT: Which one is that?

MS. SHAW: Laura Connolly?

THE COURT: Oh, I haven't seen it. I haven't seen it.

It's not one of the ones I read yesterday. Thank you. We'll get it.

So, Mr. Levine, if we were to proceed as you would wish to proceed, what would you propose?

MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, I think there are just one or

two more things I would show you today, because I think it would orient the court to some of my arguments, and then I think after that we need to have a conversation with you about the structure of the hearing to come.

I think that one of the things that we just heard from the government is, oh, I'm just raising issues that have been previously litigated. Well, that is in part true. I'm going to raise an issue that says you have a bunch of affidavits from a bunch of Department of Justice lawyers who I think when they sign a declaration take it seriously, and they're asking you to believe them, and my general believe is in most cases you should believe them. But this isn't most cases.

Representation have been made to you, your Honor, and I would like to pull one of them up. Just put the government's brief up. The government told you in very aggressive response to my motion for joint prosecution treatment these folks are not on the same team together, and I'm going to give you some examples.

I am making this argument, Judge, no to reargue my joint prosecution motion — ly ask for that later. I will make it to attack the credibility of the affidavits before you. I would like to read this with you:

"The defendants also assume, based on the similarity of various settlement paperwork with Deutsche Bank, that the independent agencies that settled with Deutsche Bank must have

jointly investigated and then aligned their view of the facts and allegations. But these similarities have a simple explanation: The facts are the facts. DOJ and these agencies did not share paperwork or have input into what resolutions each agency should have (fine amount, violations) and while the various agencies at the request of Deutsche Bank coordinated on the timing of the resolutions to the extent possible, the settlement timing cannot, and this Circuit's precedent, and does not support a finding that this was a joint investigation."

So, I'm wrong, they're right. The fact that every settlement comes out on the same day in every single one of these LIBOR prosecutions, and they thank each other profusely for all their help, that's diplomatic mumbo jumbo, and we're all Americans.

Now let's look at the e-mail which was sent. Let's see what the Department said. Let's start with the e-mail from Ms. Saulino on the bottom. She was one of the lead members of this prosecution before she departed to private practice. And, Judge, I'm offering this because she has put in an affidavit as well as the rest of the prosecution team.

THE COURT: I saw it.

MR. LEVINE: "I understand that you have shared the FCA's notice with Anthony Albanese at DFS. For reasons you and I have discussed, I don't want to see your notice. For similar

reasons, however, would you be able to identify directly to

Anthony the paragraph and portions of the P3 and P5 notice that
you sent him that involve information that was learned from
compelled individuals. If you have any questions about this
request, I can make myself available at any time tomorrow
morning."

OK. Now let's see the response from Mr. Meaney.

First sentence: "We consented to DB sharing a redacted version of our draft warning notice with DFS."

But let's concentrate on the next paragraph:

"I am not sure we can do what you request regarding our warning notice. The reality is even though we don't quote any compelled testimony in the notice, it has influenced almost every aspect of the P3 and P5 findings so it would be very difficult to identify a part that weren't influenced by the compelled testimony. Even if we could, it would be such a small part that it would make the notice meaningless."

Now, the warning notice, your Honor, in England, is a notice that comes with the final notice -- and I will represent to the court it's my understanding that in this case they are for these purposes identical or virtually identical.

P3 and P5 refer in the FCA -- they have principles of the FCA, and 3 and 5 basically all relate to the conduct at issue here. There is another part of the settlement which relates to 11 principles which are obstruction-like principles.

I will show you another e-mail that the Brits were coming to America to talk to Americans about those findings.

So, you just heard from them again that I'm just making all of this up. They represented to you no paperwork was shared? Really? They sent the DFS — the agency that they told you has nothing to do with this — and it was sent by Deutsche's lawyers, which is a whole other level of taint. But let's go to the next paragraph, because that's going to get into this even more.

"I have reviewed the draft statement of facts to go with your order and confirm that it is very consistent with the findings in our notice, except your time period for U.S. dollar goes back to 2003 and our goes back to 2005, and you make reference to Euribor submitters and we do not."

I will represent to the court that the statement of facts, I believe, are the statement of facts attached to the Deutsche Bank settlements which was entered two days later when they all came out.

Now, they made a specific representation to you, your Honor, no paperwork was shared. This is the last of the e-mails, but it's not the first in terms of timing. That representation is false.

THE COURT: I assume this is referring to the Deutsche Bank settlement order?

MR. LEVINE: Yes, two days later.

THE COURT: The order that was signed in connection with the Deutsche Bank -- it was the proposed order that ended up being signed.

MR. LEVINE: Yes, in Connecticut, and I can show it to you.

And clearly if you compare, you know, they've said as they say in their brief -- there's no surprise -- they said, well, the facts are the facts.

Well, two things, Judge. Let's just think about the wall here. Ms. Saulino -- and I will show you -- let's pull up the e-mail -- Ms. Saulino wants to find out whether they're all on the same page. Which is exactly what they said they didn't do. So, she sends the statement of facts to Meaney and Co. to review it. But think about what that means. That means Ms. Saulino is asking the United Kingdom to look at her documents and say we don't have anything that's different than yours.

Now, you know there is a great scene in the movie All The President's Men with the Bob Woodward character, I believe, is asking a question of the source who can't give him the information, and he sort of says just don't respond to me if I'm right. Everyone knows that that's just a little game, that the source is actually responding; he's confirming it, but he's doing it in a way that gets to the point without necessarily saying it.

So Ms. Saulino got the FCA to confirm their entire investigation and shape what the Department of Justice thought in some ways based on confirming this.

Now, it would be one thing if the government had been candid with you and said, hey, Judge, yes, we worked together, yes, we strategized together — and we will show you some of that — yes, we had lots and lots of interactions, but we still don't think that you have told that Brady applies and we're not on the same time.

But it's quite another when I've had to file multiple briefs saying to you, Judge, these press releases really say these guys worked together. And they don't tell you about this e-mail. They don't tell you that they knew -- and they know today, and they knew before they filed all of this stuff -- that the FCA absolutely believes that there's compelled testimony in the notice, that the FCA absolutely believes that they can't differentiate what's what. And if they can't differentiate what's what, and they admit Mr. Meaney under your Post-it that Mr. Black's testimony is identical to some of it, then how can they say it's not in there? They can't.

So I think this e-mail, and this one from

Ms. Saulino -- which basically says as we discussed, we're

attaching our drafting statement of facts. What's the subject

line? DP draft statement of facts, April 15.

So where does the representation come from that says

we didn't share any paperwork? It's a straight-up
misstatement.

And Mr. Meaney -- and who else is on this team? Well, Mr. Powers and Ms. Anderson, the other members of the trial team. All three of these people put in affidavits; they don't know anything about compelled testimony. They don't mention anything about any conversations they may have had. This e-mail I got from the government, Judge. Why am I showing it to you first?

So, I respectfully suggest the government should withdraw its comments suggesting that I'm trying to make up something about the nature of the relationship between these parties, and I think that the representation that says they didn't share paperwork is one that maybe that's another supplemental document that has to be filed to make a correction.

Now, let's go on. Now, your Honor, you have also heard that although they are in the same building there is no issues with respect to the taint team and the prosecution team, because obviously they would never talk about this stuff together. Let pull up this redacted e-mail I got.

This is from Mr. Jackson -- and I don't make any claim that he is doing anything purposefully inappropriate whatsoever. He seems like a total gentleman to me from my experience with him so far.

This e-mail with Mr. Jackson, Ms. Sipperly and Ms. Anderson, the members of the trial team. And what Mr. Jackson is reporting is that he just finished reviewing the compelled testimony in the notice, and he is sharing his thoughts on the relationship between those things.

And it's interesting, he says, yeah, there is a lot of stuff in here that's very similar to what Mr. Black says, but all he can't say, I don't know for sure that it wasn't derived. Yeah, this stuff's in there, all these topics -- not just something about eating charts -- it's all in there, but I don't know because, after all, I have no access.

So, tell me, Judge, my question to the government is which chink in the wall is this?

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson, good morning.

MR. JACKSON: Good morning, your Honor. Just to address this particular e-mail that Mr. Levine has put in front of your Honor, this was very, very early on when the taint --

THE COURT: July 2017?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, very early on for the purposes of the taint team in this case. And this was for the purpose of a hearing that I believe was to take place either — even though the e-mail was sent very very early that morning — I think the hearing was to take place later that day or perhaps the following day before this court. And the purpose was somebody on the taint team had to look at the compelled testimony of

Mr. Black and compare it to the final notice to see what there might be in the final notice that could perhaps have come from the compelled testimony.

So, I did that, and then I communicated those findings to the trial team. And I certainly attempted to be, you know, circumspect in what I conveyed, without getting into too much detail or particulars because of the issue of taint.

Subsequent to this, after talking to individuals at the FCA, we were able to determine through them that there was nothing in the compelled testimony of Mr. Black that made its way into the final notice.

The FCA did inform us -- as the e-mail from Mr. Meaney demonstrated, that defense counsel put in front of your Honor -- that compelled testimony was certainly used in the FCA's construction of the final notice, but it was not Mr. Black's compelled testimony. That testimony they found -- you know, your Honor has looked at it, and I won't try to get into any specific characterization, but --

THE COURT: Please don't.

MR. JACKSON: But they were able to confirm for us that they did not use Mr. Black's compelled testimony.

So, those e-mails, I can't stand here and make representations about lines from the trial team's brief about paperwork, but, you know, from our perspective these e-mails don't really have anything to do with the Kastigar issue

because they don't demonstrate any exposure. Quite the opposite, Ms. Saulino, as you will note in her e-mail, said in fact please don't tell me anything because I don't know what might be in there, so I don't want to be tainted.

And we would leave it that with that, unless your Honor has more questions about this particular e-mail.

THE COURT: No, I was just wondering what you had to say about it.

Mr. Levine?

MR. LEVINE: I mean, look, that's all well and good.

Can you show the rest of the e-mail.

What's all the redactions? What else happened here? This is the problem, Judge. You know, Mr. Jackson -- and he has a difficult job here today, and I respect him for doing it -- but he looked at this thing and said, yeah, these things basically match. And we will show you, Judge, they do. And what we have from the FCA is some completely conclusory, well, yes, there is a bunch of people's testimony, and we blocked Black from our mind; we can just use the others.

Well, wait a second, that's a line-by-line inquiry where they need to show you exactly what they used and how they used it. And, by the way, Meaney has already told you he can't do that, because in the quiet, when he is talking directly with the Department of Justice, and Ms. Saulino says, please, tell DFS what is the compelled stuff so I can stay away from it, his

unvarnished reaction is we can't do that; it's all mixed up, which means I'm in it.

And that's another little point. They're sending it to DFS? Compelled testimony to another agency? Which we have contended at least has to be looked at for Brady? And they told us how ridiculous we were?

Where is the communications between DFS and Department of Justice after this? Where is that in any affidavit here?

You've got, you know, members of this trial team who know about it. Where is the information on what DFS got and how was it derived? Where is the information on what was passed to other people about this?

I mean it's one thing if the government came in here,

Judge, and said, look, give me all the contacts between grand

jury, indictment and then we will deal with trial, tell me what

happened, be open about it, the Allen standard is the Allen

standard. But they don't do that. They come in and say, oh,

this is all just ridiculous, it's all nothing. And I will say

something else about that: Why is this redacted?

But it gets sort of worse -- and this is the last thing I want to show you. The one other thing that we got -- the one other thing we got are some notes of discussions. This is on the end of 14, and what this is a discussion about, your Honor, it's a call -- the exhibit number is Defense 90 -- Mr. Prange, Mr. Meaney, Mr. Stevens -- I don't know who Stevens

is; he's an FCA guy -- Mr. King, Mr. Hasan. The court will recall no doubt that Mr. Prange, King and Hasan were in Mr. Black's testimony. The government represented it showed in that brief there was no strategic work between these agencies. We didn't do that. They sort of did their thing; we did ours. It's not true. But I just want to show you this, because it shows you how closely they were coordinating.

This is an e-mail frankly criticizing a very fine

lawyer -- and a former Southern District assistant United

States attorney -- because they didn't like the way that he conducted an interview which the government and the FCA both put him up to. And here is a particular quote. In light of the fact that they never coordinated with each other there is an FCA statement: "Are you allowed speak with him?" Talking about Finzi. "The interview was so bad and they said it was Paul Weiss's fault. The document was a call in August which was a key document in the entirety of Brown/Labrum where Brown says moved it down a tick and Labrum talks about his own submission. So that call combines two strands of Brown putting in stuff from Maine and Labrum putting in stuff for himself."

So I thought they didn't coordinate with strategy.

THE COURT: Well, I would say -- well, let us put to one side what they think about the job that Mr. Finzi -- who by the way was not at the firm when I was at the firm, as everybody knows.

MR. LEVINE: I know that.

THE COURT: But I think it would be the next paragraph that would perhaps --

MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, this is one example of something I want to show you on the next page. I can do this for a long time and show you a bunch of these, but let me show you what happens here.

Because Ms. Saulino then says -- and this is an issue -- this raises other issues about the nature of this internal investigation, since the government wants to put it in against my client. But look at the top of the page. "I got the lawyer's word" -- and I'm substituting "lawyer" for his name -- "that he will approach the interview as if he were a prosecutor, but I agree this is imperfect and I'm completely open to another solution."

The FCA -- let's see what the FCA says, the people who are not cooperating, as you have been told by all those prosecution team members -- "We appreciate your Machiavellian approach with asking Paul Weiss to conduct the interview. We would like to go in on certain dates."

THE COURT: I can tell you, Mr. Levine, you have wandered so far away from Kastigar and so far back into your once and future motion on the joint prosecution issue, that I just -- I'm not.

MR. LEVINE: May I just make a proffer to the court?

THE COURT: What you're saying is I should disbelieve the Justice Department people because you can establish to my satisfaction that they were in fact conducting what would be a joint prosecution for Brady purposes.

MR. LEVINE: I'm actually -- while I think that's true, I have a slightly different variation on that.

What I'm saying to you, Judge, is this hearing, we are here to determine the nature of the relationship between the FCA and the Department of Justice and other entities. And you have been told that that relationship was one in which there were limits, and you're told there is one in which there was a wall that prevented taint.

And I am suggesting to you that I have now shown you and can continue to show you that that is not the relationship that existed, that when we have affidavits from all of those Justice Department people that make no mention of the dozens if not hundreds of calls, e-mails and meetings they had, to allow this court to assess whether in any of those calls, in any of those meetings, and in any of those other circumstances, things were indirectly communicated because they're talking about the case -- and I will show you e-mails where they're talking about Mr. Black's case -- it raises the question as to whether the government has met its burden.

I am not rearguing that motion, but the only way I can show you, Judge, that these affidavits do not necessarily have

a basis in fact is to show you that the background assumption that the court has -- which is these people were not interacting on a daily basis -- is not true.

THE COURT: What makes you think that that's my background assumption? That's not my background assumption.

MR. LEVINE: Well, I took it --

THE COURT: I mean I have to tell you joint prosecution and interacting on a daily, weekly and monthly basis are not the same thing. So do me a favor, Mr. Levine, and don't make assumptions about what my background assumptions are.

MR. LEVINE: Fair enough.

THE COURT: My background assumption is that there was in fact cooperation between the British and the American officials on the LIBOR investigation. That's my assumption, which does not create a joint prosecution and does not necessarily mean that everything in the Brits' files is Brady material.

MR. LEVINE: I think what it does show though is that when you are told that certain things didn't happen that did happen, it calls into question whether you can accept an affidavit on the same related subject. That's all I'm saying.

I'm not presuming to tell the court what to think about that motion. I'm not rearguing the motion. But when somebody tells you we didn't share paperwork with the Brits, we

didn't strategize with them, and then they're telling you and we didn't get any compelled testimony, if the two propositions are false, then it tends to cast doubt on the next proposition; or at least raises the issue, as you said in your opinion,

Mr. Prange has to come because I need to know what his contacts were with the Department of Justice from the time of the compelled testimony at least to the grand jury.

And I am now showing you that Mr. Meaney and Mr. King and all of these other folks were having very frequent contacts and the same thing applies. Because what you've said is that Mr. Prange has to come because he sat with their first cooperator — and their first cooperator didn't have a one day/two day testimony — and he changed his story a bit from what he said internally, the investigation.

So, the question is how that got shaped. And it's their burden -- not mine -- to show you that it couldn't have happened. And they have told you in these affidavits a whole bunch of nothing. They said we didn't see the thing. There is nothing in these affidavits that discloses to you these communications. They don't say, as the court has just said, look, we had frequent conversations with the FCA; we talked about them all the time. Ms. Saulino and Ms. Anderson are saying I went to England a whole bunch of times. They didn't tell you, for example, that there was a special meeting arranged where a dozen or so DOJ folks from the fraud section,

the SFO and a whole bunch of people from the FCA -- I don't know who they are -- had a two day meeting to talk about coordination.

I can't tell you what happened there. Maybe nothing happened there. But the question is not that. The question is they have to prove to you that nothing happened there, because Mr. Prange's standard applies.

And what I'm attempting to demonstrate to you, Judge, is that the notion, the only Kastigar issue here, the door that has to be closed, is the Mr. Prange door -- which I believe the court fairly inferred from the briefs that were filed before you about the nature of the relationship, so you didn't think there were any other doors to worry about -- is just not true.

So, I'm not rearguing the motion, but I'm entitled to say to you they have to close every door to get to trial in this case. They have to show you with their heavy burden that it didn't happen. And if you didn't know in your opinion in the Brady section — and I mentioned this to you when we were in court the other day — you say I have no information to say that the Department of Justice ever went to London to talk to anybody.

THE COURT: True, the first time I learned about it is when you mentioned it in court.

MR. LEVINE: Exactly right. Now, Mr. Black's proffer occurred in London. These folks -- and we have e-mails. If

you want to see e-mails about what hotels they're staying it, and who they're going to meet with, and who they're going to have drinks with from the FCA, I'll put them on.

You know, we heard before how the Department of Justice couldn't go over to London. The Department of Justice on this case has been over in London, and most of the proffers occurred over in London, they were there on a daily basis. They had meetings all the time.

The number of contacts -- frankly, we started to count -- because we got a lot of these documents very recently -- we can't even come up with a count. And that's only FCA. What about SFO? They also talk about how much they talked to some of the trial team members.

The question here is not what the result is in some other part of the case. The question is how are you going to determine without them telling you that there are all these contacts that nothing happened?

And we believe that something did happen, because we can read the FCA notice, and can I read Mr. Black's testimony.

And there is no way that what he said didn't get in there. And Curtler, he submits he read it. So, he's tainted, this indictment is tainted, and he can't testify at trial. And Mr. King we believe was subject to Mr. Prange's investigation, and we will show you here other witnesses that they talked about how Prange was going to talk to him, Ms. Saulino giving

advice to Mr. Prange about what kind of questions to ask.

That shows there is no wall, and it shows that unless they prove that every single interaction is clean, Mr. Black should be able to go home.

So, I respect the fact that you have heard from me more than enough on everything but especially on the joint prosecution team but, come on, in fairness why haven't you heard about this from them?

And these affidavits, look at all of them. The only ones that said anything about the interaction with the FCA is Ms. Anderson and Ms. Saulino say, yeah, when we talked to the FCA we told them not to tell us stuff. OK. What about these meetings? What about these calls?

Now, a lot of these calls they blacked everything out, so I don't know what happened.

So, my basic point to you, Judge, is when we take every one of these affidavits right now, and none of these people told you what their interactions were with these other regulators — oh, and by the way, there is another one, which we will put up in which there is a worry, because Bafin, the German agency, they were getting compelled testimony from the FCA too. And the government was worried that Paul Weiss was getting it. And so they wanted to ask the FCA for permission to let them talk to Paul Weiss, because they were worried that the lawyers in Germany and in England were getting stuff back

and there was going to be taint. I don't think you heard any affidavits about that. You don't have any affidavits addressing the issue about what is the communication between all of these lawyers. Although we do know from Mr. Meaney from this morning that he had some communicates with Slaughters and May and at least for some period of time he actually believed they had compelled testimony from Mr. Black. It turns out maybe they didn't. But where is that explained?

So here is this e-mail which is Defense 63.

"Steven, as part of our efforts to ensure that no information from compelled interviews is passed through others to us, we are wondering whether you would allow us to discuss with Paul Weiss the fact that you have provided some compelled interview transcripts to Bafin. We defer to you entirely on this. One reason we are asking that is so that we can impress upon them that should they receive such a request from Bafin, or reports that might contain information derived from those transcripts, we will want to make sure those materials are produced to a taint team rather than to our investigative team, and, further, that Paul Weiss attorneys don't report to us on our weekly calls about such things. Best Jennifer."

What is this about? What did Bafin get? I don't know. And the government, again, where is the wall? So Paul Weiss, which side are they on the wall? How about Slaughter? How about Bafin?

And, by the way, in all of these conversations, we haven't talked about the CFTC yet. CFTC is in on all these conversations as well. And I will direct your attention that Mr. Braun who gave you an affidavit — but he filed a different affidavit in Rabo — and in Rabo what he told Judge Rakoff was, hey, I've been telling those CFTC guys to stop going to compelled testimony.

So, we have got the CFTC who is on both sides of the wall, Judge, at least in the early period. I don't know how the CFTC behaved here, because even though -- I raised this in oral argument. I raised this in my briefs.

THE COURT: You raised it the first day I ever saw you.

MR. LEVINE: And nonetheless do you have an affidavit from the CFTC? And in fact the CFTC started this whole LIBOR investigation by contacting the FCA. That's how it started in 2009 or '10. So what have you been told about the relationship?

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Black hadn't given any compelled testimony in 2009 or '10.

MR. LEVINE: Quite right. But the point is the interactions with the CFTC and FCA and DOA jointly went on for a while.

Here is Mr. Braun's affidavit, which is Defense 38, and let's see what he says. Number 7: "I communicated

regularly with attorneys at the CFTC's Division of Enforcement during the LIBOR investigation. On various occasions I advised the CFTC representative of the potential legal ramifications of their participation in or exposure to testimony obtained by compelled interviews." Then he talks about this. And he is advised — if you go down a little bit — "I was advised that the CFTC attorney attended compelled interviews conducted in London and Singapore during the summer of 2012, and those interviews related to conduct that occurred at financial institutions other than Rabo and interdealer brokerage firms."

THE COURT: Fine. Mr. Black didn't give any compelled testimony in Singapore as far as I'm aware.

MR. LEVINE: I understand, your Honor. My question though is: With all of this, what did the CFTC do? Did they continue to talk to the FCA about compelled testimony?

And with all of this great work they're doing in 2012, how does Mr. Prange end up in a proffer with Mr. King after taking Mr. Black's testimony?

So, I don't know the answers to these questions, but I know that you haven't been given even the questions. You have been told the CFTC has nothing to do with this because the government just rested without putting anything in for them.

And I am happy to show you more e-mails in which the CFTC, DOJ and the FCA are all strategizing about this case, not for the purposes of showing you anything other than it's a door

that remains open.

You also in Mr. Meaney's affidavit, you will notice, and his letter, he didn't mention anything about giving this to DFS. If you remember, DFS doesn't appear in Mr. Meaney's letter, nor does it appear in his affidavit. He didn't tell you, oh, by the way, Judge, I threw my notice with compelled testimony over to DFS in his letter or in his affidavit.

But it seems like the Department of Justice knew about that. Can they explained why that's not a relevant factor for this court to consider, whether or not another American agency — in fact, a New York regulator — got compelled testimony, and it's not in Mr. Meaney's letter, in his affidavit, his 302 report that we just got?

What about Bafin? They knew about that as well. No explanation of anything in any of this.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. LEVINE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Do you have anything else that you want to say in response to any of that? Then we're going to move on.

MS. SHAW: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: "No, your Honor" is a very good thing to say. Normally after "no, your Honor" sitting down is an excellent idea.

OK. So, now, Mr. Levine, you've done everything except address the question that I asked you to address 20

minutes ago, which was: How are we, in your view, how are we to proceed? We have a gentleman coming to us from London; he is going to be coming to us in the middle of a murder trial that I will be conducting, so it's not like I can bring everything to a screeching halt. But I'm accommodating him, so that is when I'm planning to take his testimony.

You have made the perfectly valid point that to the extent you want to put on a case -- of which you have given me some tantalizing tidbits, almost none of which relate directly to Mr. Black, but you tell me you have all kinds of e-mails that actually do relate to your client which you haven't shown me yet -- you want to do that after you hear from Mr. Prange. Right? That's what you said. So, I need to think through what we're going to do.

MR. LEVINE: That's correct, your Honor. You know, we have a variety of materials, some with Mr. Black. We also have other information we would ask you to draw an inference on.

I think there is a couple of things I would like. I'm very concerned, and I have talked to the taint team about this last night in an e-mail. I believe there is -- the government has said -- and they have been working hard at this. Some of these folks at the front table have worked very hard to get us materials, and I appreciate it, but it's very clear that although they say they're going to abide by their Jencks and Brady and Giglio obligations and 26.2 obligations, there is

more material out there.

If Mr. Meaney was talked to or discussed in August before he put in his letter, if these folks gave statements, if there is additional Brady on these people, we are entitled to it, respectfully, and I think they should produce it and should produce it immediately. We have been talking about this for months. I ask all Brady, Giglio and Jencks to be produced.

We did ask if there are other material on the affiants, if there are other statements here that they've made. And I will tell you, Judge, they have redacted wholesale materials, which here, "Meeting with Curtler's attorneys," blacked out. First of all, that's going to be material which I'm entitled to anyway as 3500. Some of it has been turned over already from the trial team.

But there are other reports of meetings, for example, between Mr. Meaney, Mr. Powers, Ms. Saulino, that are all just blacked out, and they all relate to testimony that's relevant here.

Unless they are going to claim a privilege with the FCA -- and if they are, that's fine, they can do a log -- I want all of the statements, because people on every one of these documents are their affiants. I am entitled to statements that reflect what they've said. And I don't know who did the redaction job here; it's a horrible one. It's a tough job anyway, but I have so many documents that are totally

blacked out.

Here is one from March 25 which has the government — including members of the trial team — the CFTC — including the person that has been identified by the former chairman of the CFTC as the most important person to the CFTC's case — plus Mr. Prange, Mr. Clark, Mr. King and Mr. Meaney.

Can you pull this up. It's 192.

THE COURT: I can see.

MR. LEVINE: And it's blacked out. There was one little text that relates to Mr. Black.

Now, I have been told by the government that all this other information somehow is not relevant to the determination of the Kastigar matter. I respectfully think anything that these affiants have said, anything that's 3500, Brady material, is relevant. And I think I have shown today that there is some cause to be concerned. So, I would ask for immediate production of unredacted materials, and I would call for that immediately.

I also think to the extent that there are representations or statements that might cast doubt on any of the other affiants -- and I have suggested some places to look here -- that should be produced as well.

The government has every right in a Kastigar hearing to try to rely on affidavits, but if they do, then I have the same rights.

THE COURT: You do.

MR. LEVINE: So the one concern I have, Judge, is that with the timing of all of this, I think there is a lot more work for the government to do if they want to produce that. I am very concerned about the trial date here.

THE COURT: Oh, I am too. Oh, I am too.

MR. LEVINE: So, I would ask the court that if in fact -- you have a murder trial?

THE COURT: In January? Yes, I do.

MR. LEVINE: So I'm saying I don't think that

Mr. Prange's testimony -- his direct might be ten minutes, but

we intend to challenge --

THE COURT: Yes, I know, I did not anticipate that your cross would be 15.

MR. LEVINE: He might prove me wrong, and maybe we can all get out of here early, but I think it's going to be extensive.

I also think now, Judge, in light of this affidavit — this 302 from Meaney — and in light of the fact that the government really can't proffer any evidence, I think there is a real question for you as to who we can accept affidavits from here. There is a question.

And if there is other material out there that might tend to cast doubt on this case -- I have some other material, Judge, which I don't think you want to hear today -- that does

not relate to Mr. Black -- to Mr. Black's testimony in the FCA.

It does, however, relate to other portions of representations
that have been made to this court that are central to this
court's disposition of this matter and --

THE COURT: Of the Kastigar matter.

MR. LEVINE: Of the case itself. And it would tend to suggest that statements that have been made very recently to you are similarly inaccurate.

THE COURT: OK, I would like to focus my attention —
I have a triage brain, you know, and it comes in, it goes out.
I would like to focus my attention on the issue that's before me, which is the Kastigar issue concerning your client's compelled testimony.

Let me say a couple of things. First of all, yes, indeed the government has the right if it wishes to do so to proceed by affidavit, but that does not alter the fact that the defense, as far as I'm concerned anyway, is entitled to 3500, Brady, Giglio material for every one of those affiants, and that the government may find that the defense wishes to call some of those people on its case, or maybe not, because, as Mr. Levine keeps saying over and over again it is, after all, your burden. But it's certainly entitled to that information, just as it would be in any other pretrial hearing in a criminal case.

Second, it's clear that this matter is going to

require us to kick back the trial. You are scheduled to be here tomorrow, right? You're saying no but your team is saying yes. Mr. Breen says yes.

I need the trial team here. I need the trial team here. I need to have a conference with the trial team -- and we can get them in by telephone. If we have to get them in by telephone because they're in Washington, I don't care -- about a scheduling matter. I can't have that conversation today because I don't have the right people here, including but not limited to Mr. O'Neil, who could not be here this morning.

MR. LEVINE: We are happy to arrange the call, Judge.

THE COURT: We are on the calendar for 9:30 or 10 o'clock. 9:30? We can't be on the calendar for 9:30 tomorrow. We can be on the calendar for maybe 10:30 tomorrow morning.

After listening to what I have listened to, I will say this: I understand why he does this, and he is doing a great job for his client, I think that Mr. Levine overcomplicates the discrete issue that needs to be established under Kastigar. I think the government probably has oversimplified as well by focusing on direct taint and not really apparently giving any serious consideration to the possibility of indirect taint.

Mr. Meaney's affidavit will be unsealed except for paragraph 9. But the portion of Mr. Meaney's affidavit that remains sealed needs to be addressed. We may be in a position to address it tomorrow, I don't know, at least in part, but it

raises some issues in my mind, especially in light of one of the e-mails -- perhaps it was Defendant's 90 -- that Mr. Levine showed me today, which is the e-mail from Mr. Meaney discussing the final notice.

As is always the case at the end of one of these conferences, I need to step back from it for about an hour and then get a copy of the transcript and revisit the whole thing and try to figure out what just went on, so I'm going to do that. I will see you tomorrow.

MS. SHAW: Your Honor, the government just has one point we wanted to raise with respect to the matter of Jencks and 26.2.

While we agree with the court that certainly our Brady and Giglio obligations apply in this pretrial motions hearing, it's the government's position -- and we're happy to submit case law and briefing on this -- that the Jencks Act does not apply in this setting nor does 26.2.

We have gone through the terms of the Jencks Act as well as 26.2, and there is no applicable provision that Jencks applies in this setting.

Certainly, as I said, Brady and Giglio apply. So to the extent we have Brady and Giglio, we will continue to provide that as required. But Jencks, in our view -- and I believe under the case law -- and we have a cite that I could provide afterwards which indicates that affiants do not give

rise to an obligation to turn over Jencks in a pretrial setting.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LEVINE: May I address that very briefly?

Your Honor, the government has represented to me previously they were going to abide by their Jencks obligations, and in fact have never suggested --

THE COURT: This part of the government or the trial team?

MR. LEVINE: These folks. And they have been sending me statements on it. So, I think that's inconsistent with what their letters have said to me. But let's forget that for a second.

26.2 provides that Jencks does apply for suppression hearings. Part of the relief I'm seeking here, if not dismissal, is suppression of all tainted statements including that of Mr. Curtler's and Mr. King's. This is therefore in the nature of a hearing that is covered by 26.2 and therefore Jencks, and that is consistent with the government's previous position.

I understand that now that they've seen that their witnesses have been impeached Jencks is an inconvenient rule for them, and so is 26.2. But given that it's a suppression hearing in part, I respectfully submit the government's position is not well founded. In any event, the overwhelming

fairness of these proceedings requires it.

If in fact they won't be provided, and they will not give me Jencks, then I move under 612 and under general principles that every affidavit in this matter be struck and this matter be held by interrogation, because the court can have no confidence based on the record developed today that we have addressed this most serious constitutional issue. Thank you so much for indulging me, your Honor.

THE COURT: See you tomorrow morning.

(Adjourned)